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Abstract: Positing the implementation of evidenced-based policies to manage the informal 
economy, our paper employs, in a novel way, the multiple-cause, multiple-indicator model 
and primary data, to identify the determinants of the Nigerian informal economy. Building on 
previous literature, relevant determinants of the informal economy were constructed from 
participants’ responses to questions designed to solicit such information. We found the 
factors responsible for the origin and expansion of the Nigerian informal economy to include: 
unemployment, a need to be autonomous/self-employed, corruption of government 
officials/agencies, participants’ desire to pay less tax, and participants’ need to survive. The 
greatest influence, in terms of magnitude and impacts, comes from the ‘participants’ need to 
survive’ factor, followed by corruption. Our policy recommendations follow these identified 
factors, and recognise the positive and important role played by the informal economy. 
Although country-specific, our findings/recommendations may be used to inform policy in 
other countries with similar economic structures as Nigeria.  
Keywords: Determinants of the informal economy, Nigeria, MIMIC approach, Informal 
sector policies. 
Introduction  
In recent years, the size of the informal economy has expanded globally (Schneider et al., 
2010). This has generated increasing debates about the best way to manage the sector. In this 
study, we assert that the informal economy will best be managed if policies implemented are 
evidence-based. This underscores the need to examine, in detail, a country’s specific factors 
that (potentially) can influence the expansion of the informal economy. In this paper, the 
focus will be on the Nigerian informal economy. Nigeria, with a population of over 168 
million people, is the most populous country in Africa (World Bank, 2013). Moreover, 
following the rebasing of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2014, it became the largest 
economy in Africa and 26
th
 largest economy globally (Onuba and Abioye, 2014). Its 2013 
rebased nominal GDP was US$510bn (ibid). The implication of this is that whatever the size 
of the informal economy relative to the formal economy in Nigeria, its absolute size is likely 
to be substantial. As a result, it is likely to play an extremely important economic and social 
role. Thus there is a need to ensure policies which affect the informal economy do so to 
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maximise the overall positive impact on the Nigerian economy. Indeed, given its size, 
Nigeria’s informal economy has an importance that extends beyond the country itself. 
Previous Nigerian government policies, particularly the government implementation of a 
structural adjustment program (SAP) in the 1980s, have tended to trigger an expansion of the 
country’s informal economy (Verick, 2006). It is the need to have an empirical study which 
streamlines policy-recommendations for the informal economy in Nigeria, and further, to 
identify possible lessons for other countries, which gives an overwhelming justification for 
this study. 
In this paper, we define the informal economy as consisting of three elements: informal 
employment (i.e. those doing informal types job, regardless of the location or enterprise of 
operation); employment in the informal economy (i.e., those working in informal sector 
enterprises, regardless of the type of job done); and all legal activities that contribute to GDP 
but which are not captured by official statistics, for various reasons. These 
factors/determinants (discussed below) either cause, or reinforce, an expansion in the size of 
the informal economy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows, Section 2 reviews relevant literature, 
whilst Section 3 discusses methods. Then, results are presented and discussed in Section 4, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
2.0 Literature review 
Over the years the informal economy, as a concept, has been used to describe different 
economic conditions. It was initially thought to be a characteristic of developing countries, 
but there is now a consensus that economic activities are undertaken in the informal sector in 
all countries, and in various forms (Becker, 2004). These different views, as well as factors 
responsible for the (origin and) prevalence of the informal economy have been theorised in 
the literature. While the main theories (Dualist or Modernist, Structuralists, Legalist or Neo-
liberals, and Voluntarist or Post-structuralist theories) present their different views on why 
individuals/firms carry out their activities in the informal economy, there are some overlaps 
in their propositions. We now turn briefly to discuss these main theories. 
The early view of the informal economy is explained within the precincts of Dualism or 
Modernisation theory. Defined variously as traditional and modern sectors (Boeke, 1953), 
firm-centred and bazaar-type economies (Geertz, 1963), upper and lower circuits (Santos, 
1973), modern and traditional economies (Sethuraman, 1976), and high and low income 
sectors (Sethuraman, 1981), Dualism/Modernisation theory describes two distinct economies 
in which relative advantages exist in one (the formal) over the other (the informal economy). 
In addition, this theory argues that the informal economy exists to provide income or a safety 
net for the poor (ILO, 1972; Becker, 2004), represents a systemic flaw in, and shows the 
failure of, the economic model of a country (Bureau and Fendt, 2011), but it (the informal 
economy) will cease to exist once development and modernisation sets-in (Becker, 2004). 
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Evidence of economic failure can manifest itself through a mismatch between growth in the 
population and in modern industrial employment, and between people’s skills and the 
structure of modern employment opportunities, as well as a country’s high level of 
corruption, underdevelopment, lack of growth of the formal economy, and inadequate jobs 
for the existing workforce. All of these can contribute to an expansion in the size of the 
informal economy (ILO, 1972; Sethuraman, 1988; Bureau and Fendt, 2011; Chen, 2012). 
In contrast to Dualism, the Structuralist theory, popularised by Moser (1978) and Castells 
and Portes (1989), argues that the formal and informal economies are interconnected and 
interdependent. Additionally, the informal economy is seen as an offshoot of capitalism 
(Henry 1978; Chen, 2012), as a result of the structured development within the capitalist 
mode of production, the ‘deregulated global economy’, and economies’ ‘under-regulation’ 
(Williams 2013: 263). Under this view, firms operate in the informal economy in order to 
increase their ability to compete, reduce the power of labour unions and labour costs, avoid or 
further limit state regulations, and respond to global competition and industrialisation. This 
has led to the setting up of ‘off-shore industries, subcontracting chains, and flexible 
specialization’ (Chen, 2012: 5), as well as changing the nature of jobs from standard to non-
standard, and contracting production to small firms and/or informal workers (Portes et al., 
1989; Chen, 2012). Hence, driven primarily by the desire to make a profit (Moser, 1978), 
formal enterprises or capitalists are able to remain competitive by engaging in the informal 
economy (Castells and Portes, 1989; Becker, 2004; Chen, 2007).  
For its part, Legalist/Neo-liberal theory tends to focus primarily on how microenterprises 
respond to government bureaucracy and regulation. This theory sees firms as making a 
deliberate choice to carry out their activities in the informal economy as a result of 
government over-regulation of, or/and interventions in, the market. Whereas the Structuralist 
theory argues that a government’s market intervention and provision of social protection 
facilitates an efficient and growing economy and ‘individual self-realisation’, the neoliberals, 
in contrast, believe the opposite. Particularly, the neoliberals advocate the removal of all 
forms of restriction to the free market system, because they see ‘state interference in the 
economy and state provision of social protection as interfering with individual freedoms and 
the ability of the market to optimise the efficient allocation of resources’ (Williams 2013: 
264). Similarly, Legalist theory argues that the ‘hostile legal system [which] leads the self-
employed to operate informally with their own informal extra-legal norms’ is principally 
responsible for informality (Chen, 2012: 8). Specifically, the Legalist theory argues that 
firms’ participation in the informal economy is by choice, so as to avoid the cost, time and 
rigorous processes associated with the formal registration of their businesses, and the costs of 
remaining formal: tax burden, salaries and social security contribution burdens, 
overregulation, and the high cost of public utilities (De Soto, 1989; Becker, 2004; Macias and 
Cazzavillan, 2009; Dell’Anno and Halicioglu, 2010). The implication of this theory is that a 
simplification of, and reduction in, the bureaucratic process will enable microenterprises to 
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formalise and unleash their productive potential; but if state regulation remains burdensome, 
microenterprises will continue to operate informally (De Soto 1989; Chen 2012).  
Also suggesting participation in the informal economy by choice is the Voluntarist/Post-
Structuralist theory. Specifically, Voluntarist theory argues that many entrepreneurs 
consciously choose to carry out their activities in the informal economy, in order to avoid 
costs such as taxes, rents, and other costs of operating formally (Maloney, 2004; Chen, 2012). 
Unlike Legalist theory, which emphasises the effect of bureaucracy/over-regulation, 
Voluntarist theory focuses on the decision making process. Informal participants are 
considered rational because they engage first in a cost-benefit analysis of the formal economy 
vis-à-vis the informal economy, before deciding whether or not to operate informally. 
Similarly, Post-structuralist theory views individuals as making a deliberate choice to operate 
in the informal economy as a result of ‘social, redistributive, resistance or identity reasons’ 
(Adom and Williams, 2013: 5). The theory posits the view that the informal economy exists 
because participants are ‘social’ and not ‘economic’ actors. Economic activities are 
undertaken in the informal economy for social ties/network reasons (Persson and Malmer, 
2006), or to rediscover true self-identity (Snyder, 2004), rejecting the neoliberal system of 
workers’ exploitation and corruption in the formal economy (Biles, 2009; also see Adom and 
Williams, 2013).  
2.1 Determinants of the informal economy 
The foregoing discussion has revealed different factors which influence decisions to 
undertake activities in the informal sector or otherwise. Considering the empirical analysis in 
Section 4, and the need to clarify the way and extent to which these factors influence the 
informal economy, we consider further these determinants. 
We begin with government (over)regulation, which the Legalist/Neo-liberalist theory views 
as responsible for informality. Regulations such as (excessive) labour market regulation, 
social security legislation, and other legislation which creates bottlenecks in a firm’s 
recruitment and operational processes, have been found to have a significant influence on 
decisions to participate in the informal economy (Hart, 2012; Schneider et al., 2010). This 
can include excessive regulation of the labour market, via minimum wages or maximum 
working hours. Results from OECD studies show that setting minimum wages increases the 
level of unemployment and size of the informal economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000). In 
addition, social security contributions tend to increase the cost of labour in the formal 
economy, and hence increase the size of the informal economy (Schneider et al., 2010). 
Particularly, it increases the costs of production, and reduces the profit margin to the 
employer, if he is unable to shift the burden to the employee. However, if the cost of social 
security is successfully shifted by the employer, it reduces the actual wages of the employee. 
The channel of impact is twofold: if the cost of labour becomes too high and profit margins 
become too low, employers are forced to look for alternative ways of reducing costs, hence, 
they turn to the informal economy to drive down the cost of production in order to shore up 
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their profit. Conversely, if the effect of social security contributions is shifted to employees, 
they are forced to seek ways of earning extra income, including from the informal economy. 
Another determinant of the informal economy is tax burden. Arguably, rising tax burden 
initiates an expansion in the size of the informal economy, as individuals and/or firms are 
compelled to seek alternative sources of income from that sector (Giles et al., 2000; Sookram 
and Watson, 2008). A growing informal economy places further pressure on the government 
to increase taxes which, in turn, encourages more economic agents to informalise. 
Additionally, there is an incentive to participate in the informal economy if, in the official 
economy, the difference between the total cost of labour and after-tax earnings is high, as 
individuals would seek to avoid the difference and participate in the informal economy 
(Schneider and Enste, 2000). Contrary to expectations, evidence from Austria suggests that 
the size of the informal economy did not experience a significant reduction, despite a huge 
fall in the direct tax burden (Schneider, 1998).  
The informal economy is also influenced by under-regulation and/or inadequate commitment 
from governments, as argued by the structuralist theory. This leaves the informal economy 
unattended to by the government, and the former’s potentials, contributions and problems 
also become unknown to the latter. As a result, no action is taken to intervene in the sector, 
since, as argued by Modernism, the informal economy will die out as a passing phenomenon 
(Becker, 2004). Similarly, many formal institutions have become weak, hence, are not able to 
‘provide education, training and infrastructure as well as other incentives for structural 
reforms [, which] has contributed to the growth of the informal economy’ (Becker, 2004: 9). 
In turn, a relatively large informal economy reduces state revenue and its ability to provide a 
large quantity and quality of public goods (Schneider and Enste, 2000), and sufficient 
regulations. Any attempt by the government to stem the tide by raising tax rates for 
individuals/firms operating in the formal economy, only exacerbates the economic situation, 
as it provides further incentives for these operators to move over to the informal economy.  
Again, due to the problems of bureaucracy/over-regulation and corruption as argued, 
respectively, by the neoliberals and post-structuralists (see also modernism), individuals 
trying to start-up businesses are neither able to obtain business licence/permits, land titles, 
nor meet the excessive costs-requirements, in time. This encourages participation in the 
informal economy. Indeed, “informality was observed to be more pervasive in countries 
requiring entrepreneurs’ compliance with a large number of procedures to start a business and 
in those in which the time and cost associated with business entry were high” (Garcia-
Bolivia, 2006: 6). Similarly, studies  have observed that the size of a country’s informal 
economy increases with corruption, as entrepreneurs deliberately informalise in order to 
avoid the high costs associated with bureaucracy and corruption (Schneider and Enste, 2000; 
Ferraira-Tiryaki, 2008). Conversely, other studies (Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2012) do 
not consider corruption to be a drawback and, if anything, see it as potentially beneficial to 
economies with a large informal sector and weak institutions. Further, the informal economy 
can reduce levels of corruption (Choi and Thum, 2005; Dreher et al., 2005) because asking 
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for bribes from entrepreneurs in the formal economy can push them towards the informal 
economy. To avoid this, corrupt bureaucrats are forced to abide by the rules (Choi and Thum, 
2005) of not collecting bribes. 
An assertion recently gaining acceptance in the literature is that participants in the informal 
economy are entrepreneurs, who engage in the sector based either on ‘need’ or ‘opportunity’ 
(Williams and Nadin, 2010), and display such entrepreneurial traits and attributes as: 
innovativeness, autonomy, ability to identify opportunities, determination, creativity, 
dynamism and risk-taking (Bouchard and Dion, 2009; Williams and Nadin, 2010). Also, 
some economic units engage in the informal economy because of their desire and decisions to 
become self-employed and avoid the high cost of labour, burden of taxation, corruption and 
bureaucratic costs (Neuwirth, 2011) and burden of state overregulation (De Soto, 1989). 
These neoliberal, post-structuralist, views contrast with the structuralist, modernisation 
view, as the latter suggests that people engage in the informal economy to survive. 
Specifically, neoliberals argue that informal entrepreneurship is based on ‘choice’ whilst in 
contrast, structuralists view informal entrepreneurs as being motivated by ‘necessity’, 
adopting a last-resort strategy (Williams, 2013; Castells, and Portes, 1989; Gallin, 2001). 
Thus, structuralists describe informal entrepreneurship as involuntary, forced, reluctant, or 
survivalist (Singh and De Noble, 2003; Travers, 2002; Williams and Nadin, 2010).  
Another factor that influences the informal economy is time allocation, which determines 
different occupations (Sookram and Watson, 2008). Arguably, time is a scarce commodity 
and has to be distributed optimally between work and leisure on the one hand, and between 
the informal sector and household-related work on the other. Similarly, there are multiple 
activities that can be carried out by individuals/firms, but the latter would have to do so 
within the space of time available to all economic agents. For example, individuals who have 
formal employment can choose to combine it with activities in the informal economy, but 
they can only do so if they have spare time from their formal job, and/or are willing to trade 
off their leisure time for these informal activities. Schneider and Enste (2003) suggest a 
seamless movement of individuals between the two sectors, but other empirical results tend 
not to support this hypothesis. For example, Lemieux et al. (1994) report a negative 
relationship between the formal economy and time spent in the informal economy, and 
Sookram and Watson (2008) found marginal evidence in favour of time spent in the formal 
and the informal economy for Trinidad and Tobago. 
In addition, socioeconomic factors such as level of education (Gallaway, and Bernasek, 
2002), area of residence (Sassen-Koob, 1989), income level, number of dependents 
(Schneider et al., 2001), skills acquired, and training undergone (Becker, 2004), and 
demographic factors, such as marital status (Schneider et al., 2001), age and sex (Becker, 
2004; Loayza, 1996) tend to affect the size of the informal economy. For example, sectors 
dominated by ease of employment, particularly employment without documentation, low-
wage, low income, low-skills, and labour-intensive jobs, which can be categorised as 
structuralist factors (see Williams, 2013), have a relatively larger share in the informal 
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economy (Sookram and Watson, 2008). Also found is the prevalence of the informal 
economy in manufacturing (Castells and Portes, 1989; ILO, 2002) and construction (Marceli 
et al., 1999; Losby and Edgcomb, 2002). Again, Becker (2004) notes that the growing 
number of women going into the labour market contributes to the growth of the informal 
economy, as they do not have the right to own property/land in some countries, hence cannot 
operate formally.  
To conclude this section, it is important to reiterate that while most of these factors, for 
convenience, can be summarised under the headings structuralist (i.e., survivalist and under-
regulation determinants), neoliberal (i.e., choice, over-regulation, bureaucracy), and post-
structuralist (i.e., choice, corruption, social, redistributive, resistance or identity reasons), 
some overlaps exist. In the next section, we discuss methods employed in establishing which 
of these factors determine the Nigerian informal economy.  
3.0 Methods 
This paper employs direct methods to investigate the determinants of the Nigerian informal 
economy. Direct methods involve the use of designed instruments, interviews and 
observations to obtain information about the participants and activities undertaken in the 
informal economy (Williams, 2006; Sookram and Watson, 2008; Devey et al., 2006). It 
contrasts with indirect methods, which is based on the discrepancy between national income 
and expenditure, discrepancy between the official and actual labour force, transactions 
carried out in the economy, the amount of currency demanded in the economy, or electricity 
consumption (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Although, direct methods can be critiqued for 
producing only point estimates of the informal economy (Schneider, 2002), they suit well the 
focus of this study. 
Again, direct survey methods can be influenced by the way survey instruments are designed, 
and could suffer from imprecision and unhelpful responses from unwilling and un-
cooperative respondents, which could negatively impacts findings. Similarly, the difficulties 
associated with accessing informal activities through questionnaires, the possible unreliability 
of responses if participants are concerned about confessing to fraudulent activities and 
behaviour, and the difficulty associated with determining the actual monetary value of 
activities carried out in the informal economy, are also criticisms of the survey method found 
in the literature. These challenges were effectively mitigated in this paper by the way the 
survey instrument was designed (see Section 3.1). It is also worth reiterating that only the 
direct method can generate relevant information when the focus of a study, as here, is on 
obtaining detailed information about the characteristics of the individuals, households and 
firms operating in the informal economy.  
For data analysis, this paper employs the multiple cause, multiple indicator (MIMIC) method, 
a model-based method which involves the use of models to investigate the possible causes 
and effects of the informal economy (Section 3.2).  
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3.1 Data sampling & questionnaire design 
To collect the data in our analysis, we combined two methods that have been employed in the 
informal economy literature: a “street-by-street survey” (Reddy et al., 2003:137), and the 
spatial random sampling method (Williams, C. and Round, 2009). While the former involves 
administering a survey instrument to members of the public, the latter involves selecting 
every alternate location and participant for sampling. Thus, we went to public motor 
parks/garages, open-street markets, business premises, vendors on the street, and 
kiosks/workshops to select every alternate adult/owner of a business outfit that was willing to 
complete our questionnaire, and in instances where an individual declined, the next person 
was sampled and the one after was skipped. The data gathering exercise took place between 
May 2012 and March 2013 across 5, out of the 6, regions (covering 23 of the 36 states) in 
Nigeria. Overall, we administered about 1200 questionnaires, and achieved a success of 647 
responses. 
In order to ensure that the questionnaire was able to solicit information capable of fulfilling 
the goal of this study, and be consistent with the existing literature, we designed questions 
that could reveal information about the main determinants of the Nigerian informal economy, 
then we referred to previous studies to refine the questionnaire (Hussmanns, 2004; Myanmar, 
2009; Maligalig and Guerrero, 2008; ADB, 2011; Becker, 2004). To capture all aspects of the 
informal economy in Nigeria, as well as generate statistics that are internationally comparable 
(Maligalig and Guerrero, 2008), sufficient questions were built into the survey instrument. 
For example, the important variables that represent different definitions and survey 
approaches of the informal economy are provided by Becker (2004) Hussmanns (2004) and 
Myanmar (2009). Our survey instrument was designed to ask questions about these variables. 
The strength of our method is that it covers all aspects of the informal economy (as severally 
defined) in Nigeria, considering that a single Nigerian government definition of the informal 
economy, to the best of our knowledge, does not exist. Finally, to mitigate problems 
associated with surveying the informal sector, our questionnaire was designed to ask several 
questions in different ways, which serve as checks on each other. 
3.2 Model Specification: Multiple-Cause, Multiple-Indicators (MIMIC) model 
The MIMIC model, “a particular type of a structural equations model (SEM)” (Schneider et 
al., 2010:10), is based on the statistical theory of latent variables, which considers multiple 
causes and indicators of the informal economy (Dell’Anno, 2007). It is arguably the most 
robust technique theoretically. The method defines and depicts the association between the 
observed causes and effects of the informal economy, which is the unobserved variable, to 
compute the unobservable factors of the informal economy. The MIMIC model is a 
combination of two models: the measurement or confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) model 
and the structural model (SM), which are specified concurrently. The process begins with the 
CFA model, which defines the links between the unobserved variable and the observed-
indicator variables. It can also be specified to define the links between the latent variable and 
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the observed-causal variables (Byrne, 2010). Following the specification of the CFA model is 
the SM, which defines the relationship between the unobserved variables. Effectively, the SM 
represents the bridge between the latent variable and its causal factors, and the latent variable 
and its indicator-factors. MIMIC models mainly confirm structural theories. They are 
designed and used as confirmatory techniques, as they primarily test, with actual data, the 
representativeness and consistency of the structural model. In doing this, they fulfil two 
objectives; estimate parameters, and gauge the fit of the model (Schneider et al., 2010). Thus, 
the SM part of the MIMIC model for this paper is specified as:  
M = Df + E ..............................(1) 
Where f = (f1,...,fk) = (1xk) vector, and potentially, each fi, i=1,...,k can cause the latent 
variable M. The vector of coefficients is represented by D = (d1, d2,..., dk) is a (1 x k) and it 
describes the relationship between the latent (unobserved) variable and its causes. This 
implies that a combination of exogenous causes determine the latent variable M. It is 
assumed that the explanatory factors specified in the model may not explain all the variations 
in the latent variable, M. Hence, an error term E is added to the equation in order to account 
for the unexplained part. H represents the variance of E, and L defines the (k x k) covariance 
matrix of the factors which determine f. 
The connection between the unexplained factors and their indicators is defined by the 
measurement model, specified as: 
D = gM + U ...............................(2) 
Where D = (d1,d2,...,dt) = (1xt) vector of the multi-indicator variables, g represents the vector 
of the regression coefficients, U represents the (1xt) vector of the white noise disturbances, 
and QU is the (txt) covariance matrix.  
Combining Equations (1) and (2) will generate Equation (3), which is a “reduced form [of] 
multivariate regression model” (Schneider et al., 2010: 12). Equation (3) is defined by dn, 
n=1,...,t (endogenous variables), which are the indicators of the M’s unexplained variables, 
and fi, i=1, ..., k (exogenous variables), which are the causes of the M’s latent variable: 
d = Pf + V ................(3) 
Where P=gD, a unit-ranked matrix, and V=gE+U. V, the error term, is a (tx1) vector which 
combines the white noise error terms of the structural model (E) and measurement model (U). 
V~(0,N). N’s covariance matrix is unit-ranked, and is defined as: cov(V) = Z(gE+U)(gE+U)’ 
= gg’H + Lv. For the model to be identified and estimated, one of the components of vector g 
must be normalised to an exterior or fixed value (Bollen, 1989; Schneider et al., 2010). Also, 
the covariance matrix of the MIMIC model ∑(L) defines the co-varying relationships 
between the observed variables, and is derivable from Equations (1) and (2). Finally, the 
latent and observed variables’ structure of the MIMIC model emerges when the resulting 
matrix from Equation (1) and (2) is decomposed. Thus: 
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Where ∑(L), the covariance matrix, depends on the parameters of g and Y, as well as the 
covariances contained in q, LU, and H. Generally, the estimation of the hypothesised model 
would yield exact results as that of the population’s covariance matrix (∑), that is, ∑=∑(L),  
if the former model’s parameters are known, and correct. However, this is not the case in 
practice as the parameters, variances and covariances of the population are never known; only 
those of the samples are known. Hence, what is available for use for the estimation of the 
model, are the observed variables’ sample covariance matrix, which are the d (vector of 
indicators) and f (vector of causes), and the estimates of the unknown sample parameters. 
Overall one aims, as much as possible, to produce the closest possible parameter and 
covariance estimates to the sample covariance matrix, that is, ∑*=∑(L*), of the observed 
causes and indicators. “The function that measures how close a given [population covariance 
matrix] ∑* is to the sample covariance matrix S is called fitting function F(S;∑*)” (Schneider 
et al., 2010: 13). For most SEM users, the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation technique 
is the most popular fitting function, and is given as: 
FML = log|∑(L)| + ni[S∑
-1
(L)] – log|S| – (t + k) .........................(5) 
Where log| | represents the log of each matrix’s determinants, and the number of observable 
variables is (t+k). The application of the dynamics of Equations (1) to (5) leads to the 
computation of the coefficients of the explanatory variables, loosely termed MIMIC results, 
which are depicted in Table 2. 
4.0 Results presentation 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 depicts the information about respondents’ marital status, sex, and age statistics. It is 
clear from the table that over two-thirds of participants are male (68.7%) and married 
(74.2%). With an estimated 51% male and 62.7% married Nigerian population (NPC, 2006), 
participants’ marital status depicts a closer proximity to the true population than participants’ 
sex. These statistics suggest a high participation rate for male and married Nigerians in the 
informal economy. Table 1 also shows that respondents’ mean and standard deviation ages 
are 40 and 11 years respectively. The low standard deviation from the mean age is indicative 
of an evenly distributed sample. 
Table 1: Respondents’ marital status, sex, and age statistics 
Marital status   %  Sex  % Age Statistics  
Married 74.2  Male 68.7 Mean  40 
Separated/divorced .2  Female 31.3 Median  40 
Widowed 2.1    Std. Deviation  11 
Not married 23.4      
g(DqY +h) + LU    gDq 
qYg q 
................(4) ∑ (L) = 
11 
 
Total responses (%) 100   100   
 
Table 2 shows the reasons for engaging in a job or business activity in the informal economy. 
It is clear from the table that, while respondents engage in the informal economy for many 
reasons, the need to survive and high levels of unemployment appear to be the dominant 
reasons for doing so in Nigeria. However, operating in the Nigerian informal economy 
equally has its challenges, as participants are confronted with inadequate finance, high 
interests, and inaccessible loans (Table A2).  
Table 2: Rankings of the reasons for operating in the informal sector (%) 
 1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  4
th
  5
th
  6
th
  7
th
  8
th
  9
th
  No.1 
Unemployment/No other job 53.9 15.6 7.1 5.0 2.1 3.5 2.8 2.1 7.8 24.7 
Autonomy/Want own 
business 
27.9 13.6 17.7 11.6 8.2 7.5 4.8 5.4 3.4 13.9 
Difficult to register business 5.5 8.3 3.7 4.6 7.3 21.1 19.3 15.6 14.7 2.7 
Tax avoidance/Less tax 4.7 5.7 8.5 10.4 6.6 11.3 14.2 17.9 20.8 1.7 
Survival 59.1 20.2 7.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 1.9  42.4 
Not costly to start/operate 9.2 13.4 16.0 12.6 18.5 10.9 8.4 8.4 2.5 3.7 
Less regulations 4.8 6.7 5.8 9.6 21.2 18.3 14.4 11.5 7.7 1.7 
Easy entrance 13.3 12.5 23.4 19.5 10.9 4.7 4.7 4.7 6.3 5.8 
More profitable 7.8 6.9 7.8 15.5 11.2 5.2 12.1 16.4 17.2 3.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Finally, a preliminary analysis of respondents’ demographic and socio-economic factors 
shows that religion, age, marital status and level of education influence the size of the 
Nigerian informal economy (Tables 3 and 4). Specifically, the results suggest that more 
Muslims than Christians, more married than not-married, and more older than younger, 
Nigerians engage in the informal economy. The results also suggest that people with lower 
educational qualifications are more likely to participate in the informal economy than their 
counterparts with higher qualifications. 
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Table 3: Participants’ main job or business VS. sex, religion & marital status. 
 Sex Religion  Marital status 
Male Female Total Freq. Christian Muslim  total Freq. married Not marr. total Freq. 
Self-employed %within MAINJ 69.1 30.9 100 191 79.6 20.4 100 191 78 22 100 191 
%within variable 47 46.5  43.2 69.6  48.7 41.2  
Govt. employee %within MAINJ 67.3 32.7 100 165 92.7 7.3 100 165 81.8 18.2 100 165 
%within variable 39.5 42.5  43.5 21.4  44.1 29.4  
Corporate employee/ 
students/applicant 
%within MAINJ 73.1 26.9 100 52 90.4 9.6 100 52 42.3 57.7 100 52 
%within variable 13.5 11  13.4 8.9  7.2 29.4  
Total   68.9 31.1 100  86.3 13.7 100  75 25 100  
Total responses     408    408    408 
Chi square Phil (nom dich) .039 (.73) - Not sig .184*** .291*** 
Pearson   -.013(.79) -Not sig -.167*** .186*** 
Kendal’s tau-c  -.008(.876) - Not sig -.121*** .138*** 
Where: MAINJ = main job or business, *** = significant at 1%, ( ) = p-values 
Table 4: Participants’ main job/business activity VS. level of education & age group. 
 Level of education Age group of participants (years) 
 ≥bachelor ≥HI <bachelor ≤secondary Total 17-25 26-30 31-40 41-50 >50 total 
Self-employed %within MAINJ 31.9 26.2 41.9 100 7 16.2 27 25.9 23.8 100 
%within variable 30.0 50.5 75.5  46.4 46.9 42.7 52.7 51.8  
Govt. employee %within MAINJ 69.7 25.5 4.8 100 2.6 15.6 35.1 27.3 19.5 100 
%within variable 56.7 42.4 7.5  14.3 37.5 46.2 46.2 35.3  
Corporate employee/ 
students/applicant 
%within MAINJ 51.9 13.5 34.6 100 23.9 21.7 28.3 2.2 23.9 100 
%within variable 13.3 7.1 17  39.3 15.6 11.1 1.1 12.9  
Total   49.8 24.3 26 100 7.3 16.6 30.4 23.6 22.1 100 
Total responses     408      385 
Chi square Cramer’s V .307*** .216*** 
Pearson   -.258*** -.12** 
Kendal’s tau-c  -.257*** -.089 (.07) 
Spearman   -.303***  
Where: MAINJ = main job or business, *** & ** =significant at 1% & 5% respectively, ( ) = p-values, HI=higher institution 
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4.2 MIMIC analysis 
Employing Equations 1-5, relevant variables in Sections 4.1, 4.2.1, and existing theories of 
the informal economy, we build a model of the determinants of the Nigerian informal 
economy. As explained in Section 3.2, the first task in a MIMIC/SEM analysis is to achieve a 
best-fit model, built on the basis of existing theories. Thereafter, any variable in the chosen 
(best-fit) model which meets the MIMIC diagnostic criteria is considered important. It will 
then be included in the final model as an important determinant of the informal economy in 
Nigeria. These diagnostic criteria, which are further discussed in Section 4.2.2 are: Normed 
Fit Index (NFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA). 
4.2.1 Important Variables: causal and indicator factors. 
4.2.1.1 Causal factors:  
Regulatory burden (REGB): The literature on the informal economy is very clear on the 
major role played by government regulatory burden in encouraging informal economic 
activities (Section 2). Additionally, participants in our survey think regulation influences the 
size of the Nigerian informal economy (Table A1). The proxy for regulatory burden is 
participants’ responses to the statement, ‘government regulation of the informal economy is 
too much’.  It is a five-scale response question, and a positive sign is expected. 
Unemployment (UNEMP): Unemployment was a key causal factor of the informal economy 
in early debates. Evidence from our data (Table 2) suggests the factor still influences the size 
of the informal economy. Table 2 shows that unemployment and survival are the main 
reasons for taking up a job/business activity in the informal economy in Nigeria. The proxy 
for unemployment is the participants’ ranking of the reasons for engaging in the informal 
economy, which has been recoded into scale-data ranging from 1 to 10, where each of 10, 9 
… 2 takes the place of 1st, 2nd… 9th ranks respectively. Generally, scale data are more suitable 
for the type of analysis carried out in this section, especially as data for the other factors in 
the section are scale data. A positive relationship between the Nigerian informal economy 
and unemployment is hypothesised. 
Autonomy/self-employment (AUTO): Analysis of individuals’ desire to own their businesses 
or have working-flexibility and autonomy has recently emerged in the literature, as a factor 
which has led many to undertake business activities in the informal economy. Our data tends 
to support this. Suggestively, not all participants engage in the informal economy because 
there are no alternatives (Tables 2; A1); rather, some participate in the sector by choice. The 
data used as a proxy for autonomy were constructed in a similar way to that described for 
unemployment above. A positive relationship between the informal economy and autonomy 
is hypothesised.  
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Corruption or Business freedom (BF): Business freedom measures the kind of environment 
participants operate in. Responses to the statement, ‘it is very difficult to operate in the 
informal economy without giving bribes to some law enforcement agencies’ were used as a 
proxy for BF (Table A1). Thus, BF measures the level of corruption in the Nigerian informal 
economy. Corruption is a key determinant of the informal economy, as shown in Section 2. 
BF is derived from scale data with five points, ranging from strongly agreed to strongly 
disagreed; a positive relationship is expected between this factor and the informal economy. 
Tax burden (LTAX): One factor which has been investigated extensively in the informal 
economy literature, as a key determinant of the informal economy, is tax burden. Used in this 
section as a proxy for tax burden is ‘less tax’, which is one of the ranked reasons for engaging 
in informal activity (Table 2). Data computation is similar to the process for computing 
unemployment, described above. A positive relationship is hypothesised between LTAX and 
the informal economy. 
Survival (SURV2): The need to survive is another factor that is arguably responsible for a 
large informal economy (Section 2). The data in Table 2 tend to support this. In particular, 
most participants ranked survival as the main reason for engaging in the informal economy. 
Survival is represented by participants’ responses to the statement, ‘if government can 
provide jobs for all Nigerians, nobody will operate in the informal economy’. The data are 
constructed following the process for computing BF. A positive relationship is hypothesised 
between survival and the informal economy. 
4.2.1.2 Indicators 
The activities of the informal economy may not be captured officially, but they manifest in a 
number of ways. To unravel the relevant indicators for the Nigerian informal economy, 
participants were asked to rate the following statements from strongly agreed to strongly 
disagreed, which were later computed into scale data: 
Government should discourage the informal economy as it is harmful to the Nigerian 
economy (HPF): Respondents overwhelmingly refuted this statement (Table A1, Column D). 
Suggestively, an opposing statement is possibly true. This assumption is based on the 
consistency of participants’ responses to questions on such variables as wealth (WTH), 
growth (GROT) and overcome poverty (OPOV). Thus, it can be inferred from these 
responses that the informal economy in Nigeria is economically useful (HPF) to its 
participants and the Nigerian economy, hence, should not be discouraged. Accordingly, HPF 
was constructed as an indicator factor to enable us to carry out a MIMIC analysis. 
Informal sector activities are good for Nigeria’s economy (GROT): This statement is 
straightforward and gained overwhelming acceptance from participants (Table A1, Column 
E). We have constructed the GROT indicator to represent these positive economic (e.g., 
economic growth and income generation) effects of the Nigerian informal economy. 
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People are poor because they work or do business in the informal economy as they are 
disadvantaged (WTH): Similar to the responses on the HPF indicator, respondents also 
disagreed with this statement (Table A1, Column F). A contrasting statement is arguably 
correct; particularly, people are able to build up wealth (WTH) by working or doing business 
in the Nigerian informal economy. Thus, we construct WTH as a wealth indicator for the 
informal economy.  
Government does not have sufficient revenue as participants in the informal sector do not pay 
tax’ (TAXR): Respondents tend to disagree with this statement (Table A1, Column G). 
Suggestively, the opposite of this statement is possibly true. Again, as argued under HPF, our 
assumption is based on the consistency of participants’ responses to other questions that are 
related to TAXR. Hence, TAXR is constructed as an indicator of an informal economy which 
generates tax revenue through levies, taxes and ticket fees to the Nigerian government. 
Proportion of income from main job (PYMJ): The PYMJ was constructed from participants’ 
responses to the question, what proportion of your income is earned from main job? 
4.2.2 MIMIC results.  
Table 5: MIMIC results  
Path  Model D 
UNEMP  INFEC .077** 
AUTO  INFEC -.109** 
BF  INFEC .181** 
LTAX  INFEC .080** 
SURV2  INFEC .196** 
INFEC  HPF 1 
INFEC  WTH .500** 
INFEC  GROT .627** 
INFEC  TAXR .496** 
INFEC  PYMJ -.051 {.052} 
CMIN {P-V}; NFI; IFI; CFI 41.9 {.137}; .8; .95; .94 
RMSEA (L-H); AIC (D; S; I) .025 (.00-.046); 106; 130; 227 
Total responses 418 
Note: { } = p-value; **= sig at 5%; INFEC=informal economy; p-v=p-values; L-H=lowest-highest; CMIN (Chi-
square); DSI=dependent, saturated and independent; others are as defined. 
 
Table 5 depicts the results of the MIMIC model. The important diagnostic statistics for this 
model, the IFI, CFI, and RMSEA, are good statistically, but the NFI is not very good. 
However, considering the influence of sample size on NFI, the CFI has been recommended as 
the index of choice (Bentler, 1992). Generally, a CFI value greater than 0.9 (Bentler, 1992) or 
a value close to 0.95 (Hu and Bentler, 1999) are “considered representative of a well-fitting 
model” (Byrne, 2010: 78). The same is true for the IFI. Thus, our model meets all relevant 
diagnostic criteria sufficiently. 
Additionally, the badness-of-fit measure is statistically significant for our model. Particularly, 
with a value of 0.025, the RMSEA shows that the MIMIC model is well-fitting. Finally, the 
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AIC criterion is met, as all values of the dependent model, in all cases, are lower than both 
the saturated and independent models. Accordingly, we accept that the values of these indices 
are good and statistically significant, to allow us to use this model for our analysis. 
4.3. Discussion 
As can be seen from Table 5, the factors responsible for the origin and expansion of the 
Nigerian informal economy are: UNEMP (unemployment: no other jobs), AUTO (autonomy: 
need to be autonomous/self-employed), BF (corruption, particularly, of government officials 
and agencies), LTAX (participants’ desire to pay less tax), and SURV2 (survival: 
participants’ need to survive). However, such factors as more profit, government regulation, 
and difficulty in registering formal businesses (which were initially built into the model were 
deleted, as they did not pass the best-fit measure) are statistically non-significant, hence not 
strong determinants of the Nigerian informal economy. 
All factors except autonomy (see next paragraph for explanation), have the expected positive 
sign. This means that an increase in the size of any of the factors, except autonomy, will lead 
to an increase in the size of the informal economy in Nigeria. Specifically, a unit rise in 
unemployment, corruption, tax avoidance, and survival triggers a respective 0.077, 0.181, 
0.080, and 0.196 points expansion in the size of the Nigerian informal economy. The biggest 
influence, as one would expect, comes from the survival factor. This implies that many 
people, who do not have other options, go into the informal economy in Nigeria to engage in 
activities which enable them to earn a living. In terms of magnitude and influence, survival is 
closely followed by corruption. The implication of this is that corrupt government officials 
create an environment which encourages the informal economy in Nigeria.  
The contrasting negative sign of the autonomy factor is a bit worrying as it suggests that an 
increase in the need to be autonomous or self-employed leads to a decline in the size of the 
informal economy. Clearly, this contrasts with the existing theory on the informal economy 
which hypothesises a positive relationship between the informal economy and autonomy. 
However, one possible explanation for this result is that, relatively, the participants’ ranking 
of the autonomy variable is more evenly shared among the ‘9 ranks’ than the survival or 
unemployment variables. For example, the proportion of the first rank (as a percentage of the 
total ranks for each variable) of each of the unemployment, autonomy and survival variables 
is respectively 53.9%, 27.9% and 59.1% (see Table 2). It is thus clear that in the first rank 
alone, survival and unemployment have more than 50%, but autonomy is just a quarter. 
Additionally, while survival and unemployment respectively have their rankings in a 
descending order, it is not so with autonomy which, for its part, shows an irregular pattern in 
its ranking. 
Also from results, it can be seen that the activities of the informal economy in Nigeria are 
indicated by the following factors: HPF (economically useful to participants and economy), 
WTH (wealth for participants), and GROT (the informal economy is good for the economy). 
These indicators experience an increase whenever there is an expansion in the size of the 
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Nigerian informal economy. Specifically, a unit increase in the size of the Nigerian informal 
economy leads to a respective 1.0, 0.5 and 0.63 points increase in HPF, WTH and GROT. 
The implication of this is that the informal economy contributes positively to the Nigerian 
economy in total, by creating wealth for participants and contributing to GDP growth. 
4.3.1 Policy implications 
Job provision and entrepreneurial development: Considering that unemployment and 
survival are often quoted as key reasons for engaging in the informal economy, implementing 
policies that facilitate the provision of employment will reduce the size of the informal 
economy in Nigeria. To begin with, such policies should target transitory participants, i.e. job 
applicants and most university graduates, who operate in the informal economy while 
engaging in active search for full-time employment. The Nigerian government can facilitate 
jobs by creating an environment conducive for the private sector to create quality jobs. 
Although successive Nigerian governments since the SAP era of the 1980s have encouraged 
private sector-led job-creation, the former has not created a sufficiently enabling environment 
for the latter to be successful. For example, reported in Table A2 as inhibitors of business 
operations in Nigeria are: inadequate infrastructures, insecurity, inadequate roads and 
electricity, and policy inconsistencies. The government of Nigeria should seek, and be 
committed to, addressing these problems in order for the private sector to thrive and create 
jobs.  
However, it is shown in Section 4.2 that some people participate in the informal economy by 
choice, and not because there are no jobs. Also, Table 2 shows that some of these participants 
are with low educational qualifications, secondary school drop outs, and those without a 
formal education. Clearly, these categories of participants will require a system which 
enables them to develop job-related and entrepreneurial skills in order to achieve gainful 
employment. Policies which encourage the setting up of apprenticeship systems and reforms 
in the education system would be of great help. Those with skills gaps can be trained, and 
those without a formal education can then be helped to go through the apprenticeship system.  
Deal with Corruption: Some participants in the informal economy find it difficult to register 
their enterprises, because of the bureaucratic nature of the process of registration and 
government institutions, whilst some participants are mishandled and harassed by corrupt 
government officials (Tables 2; A2). Arguably, these government officials will prefer an 
imperfect system and a large number of unregistered informal participants in order for them 
to continue to collect bribes and levies that are not officially accounted for. To influence the 
informal economy, the government should address these problems. Particularly, the Nigerian 
government should be committed to fighting corruption, scaling down the negative effects of 
bureaucracy and reversing the execution of projects that benefit only a few Nigerians. 
Financial assistance and training for budding entrepreneurs in the informal economy: While 
funding is germane to the success of an enterprise, inadequate access to finance/credit 
facilities can be a constraint, and highlighted as one of the main problems facing participants 
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in the Nigerian informal economy (Table A2). The government can support these businesses 
by facilitating accessibility to finance directly and/or indirectly. Direct support can be in the 
form of budgetary allocations to the sector, disbursed through a specialised financial 
institution at low interest rates. Indirect support can be in the form of a guarantee for any 
commercial bank’s scheme (e.g. a designed product which reduces the credit criteria and 
complexities for targeted clientele), which makes credit easily accessible to informal 
enterprises. With these schemes in place, qualifying informal enterprises will not be denied 
access to finance because of their limited initial capital outlay. Also, it will provide access for 
the participants who need funds for expansion, but who consider the commercial banks’ 
lending rates too high. Finally, by providing financial support through these schemes, the 
government can initiate a system which facilitates the formalisation of these informal 
enterprises and participants. 
Related to finance, is the need to facilitate training for the budding entrepreneurs in the 
informal economy, as some of these participants who seek relevant technical, financial and 
managerial skills to improve their business performance often do not know how and where to 
go for such training. Government can step in to close this gap. To begin, the education system 
should be reformed to suit what the nation needs for development. For example, training in 
entrepreneurship should be added to the curriculum of schools and higher institutions to 
enable those who have the innate skills to add on formal training. Additionally, the 
government of Nigeria can provide a special school for the formal training of informal 
participants, which is akin to what it did recently for nomadic cattle farmers in the Northern 
region of Nigeria, when it started to provide special schools, at their various settlements. In 
addition, policies which make primary and secondary school education compulsory for all 
citizens should be enforced. Finally, if an apprenticeship system is developed, as 
recommended in the previous section, participants in the informal economy who do not want 
to attend university, will be able to receive the training that will enable them to fully hone 
their entrepreneurial skills.  
Conclusions:  
Employing primary data and the MIMIC approach, this study reports five factors which 
determine the size of the Nigerian informal economy: survival, unemployment, corruption, 
autonomy, and less tax. Following these findings, appropriate policy recommendations were 
proposed. These findings and recommendations could be applicable to other countries with 
similar sizes and structure of informal economy since most of the factors reported have been 
found to be responsible for the origin and expansion of the informal economy in the 
literature, as discussed in Section 2. However, potential variances in magnitudes and 
influences could exist for these determinants for each country. This necessitates separate 
studies for individual countries. 
Considering that no single study can cover all aspects of the informal economy, future studies 
could employ other methods and data to investigate the determinants of the Nigerian informal 
19 
 
economy. There is a need to have a closer look at data from particular states, and/or employ 
secondary data in a similar study. The former will enable the researcher to first carry out a 
household survey to identify those engaged in the informal economy, before sampling these 
identified groups. This, we could not achieve in the current study due to time, cost and 
security constraints, considering that our survey covered 23, out of the 36, states in Nigeria. 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Respondents’ perceptions on various indicators 
 A B C D E F G H 
Strongly Agreed 17.9 12.7 20.4 5.0 29.3 10.2 7.8 19.6 
Agreed 16.4 31.3 32.7 6.9 43.7 19.4 18.0 47.5 
Neither 9.5 23.9 16.3 8.9 12.2 15.7 16.7 15.0 
Disagreed 32.2 26.8 18.6 27.5 9.1 31.2 35.2 10.5 
Strongly Disagreed 24.0 5.3 12.0 51.8 5.7 23.6 22.2 7.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total responses 391 377 392 597 583 581 599 592 
22 
 
Note: A - If government can provide job for every Nigerian, nobody would participate in informal activities; B - 
Government regulation of businesses is too much; C - It is very difficult to do business in the informal sector without giving 
bribes to some-law enforcement agents; D - Government should discourage the informal sector as it is harmful to the 
Nigerian economy; E - Informal sector activities are good for Nigeria’s economy; F - People are poor because they work or 
do business in the informal sector as participants are disadvantaged; G - Government does not have sufficient revenue 
because informal workers do not pay tax; H - Informal sector helps people that are poor to overcome poverty in Nigeria. 
 
Table A2: Biggest problems & challenges of the informal economy 
What do you know or think is the biggest 
problem faced by the informal sector? 
%  Challenges confronting 
participants 
1
st
 2
nd
  
inadequate finance, high interests, inaccessible 
loans 
43.2 Supply of raw materials 9.8 4.9 
record keeping (poor, none), management 
capacity, skills gap 
6 Access to land, space for 
business 
6.2 13.4 
job security, irregularity, high risk, poverty 9.3 Lack of adequate machines, 
equipment 
4.1 18.3 
government unsupportive & irresponsible 13.1 Difficult to get loan 17.5 7.3 
excessive tax 6.0 Lack of customers 18 11 
Corruption (employee, govt., its officials) 2.2 Too much competition 24.2 20.7 
overregulation, unfriendly policies & 
environment, 
2.2 Organisation, management 
difficulty 
3.1 4.9 
high competition, little revenue & patronage 9.8 Too much govt. control, taxes 8.2 7.3 
Others(poor electricity, road, insecurity-
inadequate infrastructure, mkt. access) 
4.4 Too little revenue 8.8 9.8 
  Others  2.4 
Total  100 Total responses 100 100 
  
 
